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Morality and Epistemic Judgment 
The Argument From Analogy 
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Part I. The Argument From Analogy 
 
1. Moral Error Theory 
1.1 Preliminaries 
1.2 Internalism-based argument: commitment premise 
1.3 Internalism-based argument: existential premise 
1.4 Irreducibility-based argument: commitment premise 
1.5 Irreducibility-based argument: existential premise 
1.6 Contrasting the arguments 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
2. The Analogy 
2.1 Preliminaries 
2.2 The parity premise: internalism-based 
2.3 The parity premise: irreducibility-based 
2.4 Das, Finlay and parity 
2.5 The epistemic existence premise 
2.6 Roadmap and strategic omissions 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
Part II. Against the Analogy 
 
3. Against Internalism-Parity 
3.1 Internalism-parity and the basic rationale 
3.2 Explanation and trivial truths 
3.3 Explanation and trivial truths in morality 
3.4 Considered propositions and negative reasons 
3.5 The conventionalism criticism 
3.6 Work for epistemic institutionalists 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
4. Against Internalism-Parity: A Further Argument 
4.1 The structure of the argument 
4.2 Action-explanation arguments 
4.3 The upshot and several objections 
4.4 Less clear-cut cases 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
5. Against Irreducibility-Parity 
5.1 Irreducibility-parity and the basic rationale 
5.2 Streumer on irreducibility-parity 
5.3 Heathwood on parity 




Part III. Elaboration 
 
6. The Conventionalism Criticism 
6.1 An attitudinal disanalogy  
6.2 The belief-based rationale 
6.3 The intentional interpretation 
6.4 The evolutionary interpretation 
6.5 The concept of belief 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
7. Simple Veritism 
7.1 Criticisms of simple veritism 
7.2 Defending veritism 
7.3 Knowledge as the epistemic aim 
7.4 The anti-consequentialist argument 
7.5 Veritism and credence-based views 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
8. The Normativity of Evidence 
8.1 Evidence and probability  
8.2 The nature of probability problem 
8.3 The problem of background information 
8.4 The degree of likelihood problem 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
Part IV. Fall-Backs and Loose-Ends 
 
9. Error Theory and Thought 
9.1 Normativism and error theory 
9.2 Against conceptual normativism 
9.3 Moore’s Paradox and conceptual normativism 
9.4 An error theory of belief? 
9.5 Normativity and deliberation 
9.6 Conclusion 
 
10. A Puzzling Combination 
10.1 The structure of the argument 
10.2 Moral debunking and dispensability  
10.3 Epistemic debunking and dispensability 










Moral judgments attempt to describe a reality that does not exist. As a consequence 
those judgments – and those of us who make them – are systematically mistaken. This 
is the moral error theory. It is an unsettling thesis. Our moral views provide meaning 
and purpose in our lives, structure societies, legitimise punishment and on occasion 
demand great personal sacrifices. But according to moral error theorists they are 
nonetheless mistaken. In The Gay Science Nietzsche wrote: “Life is no argument at 
all; the conditions of life might include error.”1 He was not defending the moral error 
theory but he expressed the sentiment behind it nonetheless. If the moral error theory 
is true, then one of the most pervasive features of human life – and arguably a key 
feature in the development and success of our species - is in error. Might morality be 
systematically mistaken in this way? This book is about an important argument for 
thinking it could not be. It is called the argument from analogy. I ask whether it 
succeeds. I argue it does not. This is good news for moral error theorists. It may be 
bad news for us.2 Or so I shall argue. 
 
The basic structure of the argument from analogy is very simple. There are two key 
moves. The first move is to draw a comparison between moral judgments and 
epistemic judgments: judgments about what one ought to believe given one’s 
evidence. Like moral judgments, epistemic judgments concern how one ought to 
behave in a sense that transcends personal interest and social convention. The second 
move is to use this comparison to reject the moral error theory. Because moral 
																																																								
1 Nietzsche 1974, 121. 
2 Moral abolitionists disagree. See e.g. Garner 2007.  
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judgment and epistemic judgment are so similar, any case for a moral error theory 
would entail an error theory about epistemic judgment too. But we know that an error 
theory about epistemic judgment is false. We could not reason or think in a systematic 
fashion without epistemic judgments. The conclusion is that the argument for the 
moral error theory must have gone wrong somewhere along the way.  
 
This is the argument from analogy. It is a simple, powerful argument. In this book I 
systematise and assess its extensive recent use. I claim that it fails. I will get into the 
details in due course. But it is worth saying something more about the motivation for 
the project. The argument from analogy stands at the intersection of three different 
trends within contemporary philosophy, each of which is presently enjoying ‘a 
moment’. The first of these concerns the moral error theory itself. There are few 
views in philosophy so closely associated with a single figure as the moral error 
theory is with J.L. Mackie.3 But in recent years the view has found new supporters. 
Richard Joyce’s The Myth of Morality has been followed by further volumes by Jonas 
Olson, Bart Streumer, Joel Marks and Wouter Kalf.4 Each defends the moral error 
theory. The result is that the moral error theory is no longer eccentric or fringe. It is 
now one of the canonical ‘positions’ in metaethics, deserving of serious engagement. 
 
The second trend concerns the general strategy of arguing by analogy in moral 
philosophy. This too is having something of a moment. Arguments by analogy work 
by drawing a comparison between morality and some non-moral analogue. This 
comparison is then used to establish a conclusion about morality. A traditionally 
																																																								
3 Mackie 1977. 
4 Joyce 2001, Olson 2014, Streumer 2017, Marks 2012, Kalf 2018. 
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popular analogy has been with secondary qualities, such as colour.5 The analogy 
between morality and mathematics has an even more distinguished history. It has 
been – and continues to be - a fruitful source of arguments against moral scepticism 
and of models for how moral epistemology should work.6  More recently the use of 
arguments by analogy as a strategy within moral philosophy – so-called ‘companions 
in guilt arguments’ - has been the subject of philosophical study and interest in its 
own right.7 Indeed this is in part a consequence of Mackie’s suggestion that 
opponents of the error theory argue in this way: 
 
[T]he best move for the moral objectivist is not to evade this issue, but to look for 
companions in guilt.8  
 
These two convergent trends explain why - at this point in philosophical time – there 
should be an interest in using analogies to tackle the moral error theory. But why with 
epistemology as the analogue? Enter the third trend. It is increasingly common to 
think of epistemology and morality as in relevant respects the same kind of thing. This 
is for the most part a consequence of a shift in the mind-set of many epistemologists. 
They have increasingly come to think of epistemology as an evaluative or normative 
discipline. Its task is not merely to make descriptive claims about our beliefs and 
belief-forming mechanisms but to evaluate or recommend; to tell us which beliefs we 
should or shouldn’t form. This is clearly expressed by Mark Schroeder:  
 
																																																								
5 See especially McDowell 1998. 
6 Gill 2008. See e.g. Scanlon 2014: 70 and for discussion Clarke-Doane 2014. 
7 See Lillehammer 2007, Sinclair and Leibowitz 2015, Rowland and Cowie 
forthcoming. 
8 Mackie 1977, 39. 
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Epistemology is in part a normative discipline. Epistemologists are not concerned 
simply with what people believe…They are concerned with what people should 
believe.9 
 
This normative or evaluative ‘turn’ in epistemology brings it into the same orbit as 
morality. Both are normative or evaluative.  
 
Given these three trends the argument from analogy is something of a Hegelian 
inevitability: a natural synthesis of the existing philosophical dialectics. Unlike Hegel 
however I can’t claim to have got there first. Versions of the argument from analogy 
have been around for some time now. The first systematic treatment was provided by 
Terence Cuneo in his 2007 book The Normative Web. Here, Cuneo made use of a 
variant on the argument from analogy to undermine the moral error theory (amongst 
other things). Addressing Mackie, he writes: 
 
J.L. Mackie was a moral nihilist... But he expressed no sympathy for epistemic 
nihilism... I doubt that he would’ve had much sympathy with it. For Mackie 
believed in the power of argument and reason.10  
  
The point is a powerful one. A substantial literature has since developed in response 
to it; some supportive, some not. The most modest ambition of this book is to fairly 
and informatively systematise that literature while it is still possible to do so. The 
more ambitious aim is to show that the argument that it is about is misguided. 
 
																																																								
9 Schroeder 2015, 379. 
10 Cuneo 2007, 122. 
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The roadmap is as follows. In chapters 1 to 2 I present the basics that we will be 
concerned with: the moral error theory and the argument from analogy. In chapters 3 
to 5 I present my basic cases(s) for rejecting the argument from analogy. In chapters 6 
to 8 I elaborate on and defend my arguments. In chapters 9 to 10 I defend some ‘fall-
back’ positions should my earlier arguments fail and draw together some loose-ends. 
In chapter 11 I conclude by re-capping on the overall structure of my argument and 
the key moves in each chapter: disorientated readers may refer to this chapter as they 
go. My conclusion is that the argument from analogy fails. I do not infer from this 
that the moral error theory is true. My arguments do not entitle me to this conclusion. 
But I do claim that – for now at least – I do not know that it is false.  
 
